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BAKKE BETRAYED
ALAN J. MEESE*
I
INTRODUCTION
The President must “take care that the laws are faithfully executed.”1  Such
faithful execution requires more than mere careful attention to the language of
statutes; it also requires the President to interpret the Constitution.  The Consti-
tution, after all, is the supreme law of the land, law that Presidents must en-
force.2  Just as judges exercise judicial review, Presidents must also exercise
“presidential review,” refusing to enforce statutes they believe are unconstitu-
tional.3
The existence of presidential review begs an important question:  How much
deference should the Executive accord to courts when determining whether a
statute offends the Constitution?  According to some scholars, judges have the
“last word” about the meaning of the Constitution.4  As they see things, the po-
litical branches are perfectly free to derive their own meaning of the Constitu-
tion, unless and until the Supreme Court has spoken.  Once the Court has spo-
ken, however, the President and others must “toe the line,” implementing the
Court’s view of the Constitution.5  Not surprisingly, this “judicial hegemony”
view finds support is some rather self-important Supreme Court dicta.6
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1. U.S. CONST art. II, § 3.
2. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905 (1989-90).
3. See generally id.  See Freytag v. CIR, 501 U.S. 868, 906 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199
(1994).
4. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997).  A recent opinion by the Office of Legal Counsel apparently took this
position:
The Supreme Court plays a special role in resolving disputes about the constitutionality of en-
actments.  As a general matter, if the President believes that the Court would sustain a par-
ticular provision as constitutional, the President should execute the statute, notwithstanding
his own beliefs about the constitutional issue.  If, however, the President, exercising his inde-
pendent judgment, determines both that a provision would violate the Constitution and that it
is probable that the Court would agree with him, the President has the authority to decline to
execute the statute.
Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 199,
200 (1994).
5. See generally Alexander & Schauer, supra note 4, passim.
6. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (claiming that “the root of
American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the
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Another view, however, treats the political branches as coequal even when
it comes to constitutional interpretation.  Under this approach, the President
need not subordinate his own view of the Constitution to that of the Supreme
Court, but may instead adopt and implement an independent interpretation.7
For instance, the President may refuse to enforce a statute he believes to be un-
constitutional even if the Supreme Court has recently sustained it.8  Proponents
of this approach argue that the Constitution may be interpreted by everyone,
not merely judges, and that the process of constitutional interpretation is and
should consist of a dialogue between the Court, the political branches and, ul-
timately, the people.9
Regardless of its normative merit, the judicial hegemony approach appears
inconsistent with our constitutional traditions.10  Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill
to reauthorize the National Bank on constitutional grounds, paying no defer-
ence to the unanimous opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.11  Lincoln refused to
follow the rule announced in Dred Scott,12 and vowed to undo it.13  Franklin D.
                                                          
Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this Court”); Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
7. See Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 982-90 (1987).
8. See Paul L. Colby, Two Views on the Legitimacy of Nonacquiescence in Judicial Opinions, 61
TUL. L. REV. 1041, 1050-61 (1987); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive
Power To Say What The Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 271-72 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L.
REV. 83 (1998).  President Lincoln summarized this view in his first inaugural address:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions af-
fecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, . . . the
people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of
the United States, S. DOC. NO. 101-10, at 139 (1989).
James Madison held similar views:
As the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial departments of the United States are co-ordinate,
and each equally bound to support the Constitution, it follows that each must, in the exercise
of its functions, be guided by the text of the Constitution according to its own interpretation
of it; and, consequently, that in the event of irreconcilable interpretations, the prevalence of
the one or the other department must depend on the nature of the case, as receiving its final
decision from one or the other, and passing from that decision into effect, without involving
the functions of the other.
James Madison, Unaddressed Letter of 1834, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 349 (1867) (quoting President Andrew Jackson).
10. See NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 10-18 (1996).
11. 17 U.S. (Wheat) 316 (1819); see DEVINS, supra note 10, at 14.  According to President Jackson,
[t]he opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of the Con-
gress has over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of both.  Each public
official who takes an oath to support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he un-
derstands it, and not as it is understood by others.
Id., quoting
12. Dred Scott v Sanford, 60 U.S. (How) 393 (1857).
13. See DEVINS, supra note 10, at 14-15; Colby, supra note 8, at 1053 (“In two cases arising in Bos-
ton, Lincoln refused to allow his federal agents to deny a black student his passport or a black inventor
his patent.”).
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Roosevelt, of course, proposed legislation inconsistent with Lochner14 and its
progeny.15  More recently, President Reagan vetoed the Fairness Doctrine, be-
cause it offended the First Amendment, despite clear “law” to the contrary.16
He also carried on a vigorous campaign against Roe v. Wade17 and issued Execu-
tive Orders based on views of the Constitution at odds with Supreme Court
precedent.18  By opposing the Court’s reading of the Constitution, these Presi-
dents touched off a dialogue about the meaning of the various constitutional
provisions involved.19
Of course, open defiance of Supreme Court doctrine may come with a high
price—particularly if the doctrine is popular.  Presidents who claim the author-
ity to disagree with the Court may face charges that they are ignoring “the Con-
stitution,” which some at least equate with the Court’s case law.20  To be sure,
Presidents can attempt to convince the public that it is the judges who have de-
parted from the Constitution, both by claiming a monopoly on interpretation
and “getting it wrong” on the merits.  Still, not all Presidents are Lincoln, and
not all cases are as clearly incorrect as Dred Scott.  Moreover, the public may
well look askance at politicians who claim to know more about the Constitution
than life-tenured judges.  Thus, a President who defies the Court runs the risk
of initiating a dialogue that he cannot win—a dialogue that, ironically, might
further entrench the rule he opposes.
Thus, it seems that a President who disagrees with the Court’s account of
the Constitution faces two rather unpalatable choices:  enforce the Court’s deci-
sion “to the letter,” or defy the Court and take his case to a skeptical populace.
There is, however, a “third way”—a way in which a President can “have his
cake and eat it too.”  The President can publically embrace the doctrine in ques-
                                                          
14. Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15. See DEVINS, supra note 10, at 16-18; Easterbrook, supra note 2, at 911.
16. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (sustaining so-called “Fairness
Doctrine” against First Amendment challenge); President’s Message to the Senate Returning Without
Approval the Fairness in Broadcasting Bill, 1 PUB. PAPERS 690 (June 19, 1987); DEVINS, supra note 10,
at 35.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. For instance, Executive Order 12,630, “Governmental Actions and Interference With Constitu-
tionally Protected Property Rights,” declared that regulations that “substantially affect [the] value or
use” of private property would constitute compensable takings unless such regulations addressed “real
and substantial threats to public health and safety,” “were designed to advance significantly the health
and safety purpose,” and produced burdens on property “no greater than necessary to achieve the
health and safety purpose.”  1 Pub. Papers 340-41 (Mar. 16, 1988).  The requirement that the regulatory
burden be “no greater than necessary” is not consistent with judicial precedent.  See Agins  v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
19. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 9, at 90-106 (arguing that dialogue between the branches will
produce more durable and legitimate settlement of constitutional issues).
20. For instance, when President Reagan’s Attorney General suggested that the Constitution, and
not case law, is the Supreme Law of the Land, the then-president of the American Bar Association
claimed that such an approach would “shake the foundations of our legal system.”  See id. at 83 n.5; see
also, e.g., Matthew J. Franck, Support and Defend: How Congress Can Save the Constitution from the
Supreme Court, 2 TEX. REV. OF LAW & POL. 315, 324-25 (1998) (noting that one senator has “made a
fetish over the last decade of asking [Supreme Court] nominees to . . . affirm the superiority of the
Court over all rivals in these matters”).
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tion, while at the same time refusing to follow it.  For instance, a President
could purport to agree with the Supreme Court that the Fairness Doctrine is
constitutional, while at the same time appointing FCC Commissioners who will
dismantle it on purportedly non-constitutional grounds.  Or a President can
purport to agree with the Court that Congress has plenary control over inter-
state commerce, but veto an increase in the minimum wage because it suppos-
edly imposes an undue burden on small businesses.  By pursuing such a strat-
egy, the President can work to ensure that federal law reflects his constitutional
vision, without submitting that vision to the people for consideration.
The Clinton Administration has followed just such a “third way” approach
to Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.21  As a rhetorical matter, the
Administration has embraced Justice Powell’s controlling opinion in this case,
characterizing certain language in the opinion as a “holding” that approved ra-
cial preferences in college admissions purportedly designed to further “diver-
sity.”  On the other hand, the Administration has actually adopted or encour-
aged a variety of racial preferences that were plainly inconsistent with the very
language in Justice Powell’s opinion that it embraced.  Thus, while the Admini-
stration treated Justice Powell’s opinion as the “last word” on the subject of
preferences, in practice it ignored key aspects of that opinion.  Instead of wres-
tling with the Court openly about the proper scope for racial preferences, the
Administration instead defied the Court sub silentio, all the while purporting to
“toe the line.”  While such a course may have been politically expedient, it de-
prived the public of the dialogue that open defiance of Bakke would have pro-
duced and may, over the long run, ultimately hasten the demise of racial prefer-
ences.
II
A REVIEW OF THE BAKKE DECISION
Any analysis of the Administration’s interpretation of Bakke must, of
course, begin with a review of that decision.  In Bakke, the Justices considered a
“special admissions program” administered by the medical school at the Uni-
versity of California at Davis.  Under this program, Davis reserved or “set
aside” sixteen places in the entering class of one hundred for individuals who
were members of certain minority groups.22  The school filled these spaces with
those members of underrepresented groups that were otherwise the most quali-
fied for admission.  Individuals who were not members of these favored groups
competed for the remaining, unrestricted spots.
Allan Bakke lost that competition, and he sued the Davis Medical School,
arguing that the special admissions program contravened the Fourteenth
Amendment and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.23  Davis conceded
                                                          
21. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
22. See id. at 272-76 (describing operation of special admissions program).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2000).
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that, but for the special admissions program, it would have admitted Bakke.24
Nevertheless, the school argued that its treatment of Bakke was necessary to
accomplish several important objectives.  First, the school claimed that the set-
asides would help increase the number of physicians from underrepresented
groups, and thus enhance the medical services available in minority communi-
ties.25  Second, the school argued that the program was necessary to remedy the
effects of prior discrimination suffered by applicants from underrepresented
groups.26  Finally, the school argued that the program would create a “diverse”
student body.27  Such diversity, the school argued, would enrich the educational
experiences of all students by exposing them to numerous perspectives, atti-
tudes, and viewpoints.28
The Court split on the propriety of Davis’s special admissions program.
Four justices held that the program was justified as an attempt to ameliorate the
effects of prior discrimination.29  Four other justices refused to reach the consti-
tutional question, finding that the special admissions program violated Title
VI.30  Justice Powell provided the crucial vote, and he announced the judgment
of the Court.  According to Justice Powell, the Davis plan was unconstitutional
because it created a set-aside or quota for favored minorities.31  Such a plan, the
Justice said, could not be justified as an attempt to remedy previous discrimina-
tion because the Davis Medical School had made no findings regarding the in-
jury or appropriate remedy for such discrimination, nor was it competent to
make such a finding.32  Moreover, Davis had adduced no evidence that minority
physicians were more likely to serve underserved minority communities.33  Fi-
nally, Justice Powell rejected Davis’s assertion that its program was justified as
an attempt to enhance the diversity of its student body.  All Davis had done, the
Justice said, was to pursue racial diversity simpliciter.34  Moreover, the school
had done so by insulating a subset of minority applicants from any comparison
with non-minority applicants, many of whom might themselves have possessed
characteristics that rendered them “diverse.”35  Thus, Powell concluded, the
Davis program did not advance a compelling state interest, and offended the
Equal Protection Clause.36
                                                          
24. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81.
25. See id. at 310-11.
26. See id. at 307-10.
27. See id. at 311-15 (describing this contention).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 355-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., joint opinion).
30. See id. at 412-21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Burger, C.J.,
Stewart, and Rehnquist, JJ.).
31. See id. at 305-15.
32. See id. at 308-39.
33. See id. at 310-11 & n.46 (“The only evidence in the record with respect to such underservice [of
minority communities] is a newspaper article.”).
34. See id. at 315 (“Petitioner’s special admissions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity,
would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.”).
35. See id. at 315-17.
36. See id. at 320.  “The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far
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Justice Powell did not stop there.  Not only did he conclude that the Davis
program was void, he also opined on the constitutionality of a different admis-
sions scheme, a scheme advanced by several amici curiae, including Harvard,
Princeton, and Stanford.37  Under the so-called “Harvard Plan,” admissions of-
ficers purportedly considered numerous factors bearing on an applicant’s “di-
versity,” including state of residence, rural upbringing, musical or artistic talent,
athletic ability, academic interests, career interests, political views, and ethnic or
racial identity.38  No quotas were set, and admissions officers gave “individual-
ized consideration” to each application.39  So, for instance, a process that had al-
ready admitted several African-Americans from privileged backgrounds might
prefer a less privileged African-American with “an apparently abiding interest
in black power” to an otherwise more qualified candidate.40  Or a school that
had already admitted several privileged and underprivileged African-
Americans might prefer “a white student with extraordinary artistic talent.”41
Such a plan, Justice Powell said, pursued diversity consistently, and thus ad-
vanced a compelling interest.42  Moreover, unlike the Davis Plan, such a plan
treated each applicant as an individual, and not merely as a member of a racial
group.43  Thus, Powell concluded, such a plan would be constitutional.44
Although Justice Powell spoke only for himself, he announced the judgment
of the Court, declaring the Davis plan unconstitutional.  Moreover, unlike those
                                                          
broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element.”  Id. at 315.
37. See generally Brief of Columbia University et al. as Amicus Curiae, Bakke, 433 U.S. 265 (1978)
(No. 76-811), reprinted in 99 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 689 (Philip Kurland & Gerhardt Casper eds., 1978).
38. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322-23 (reproducing Harvard College Admissions Program); see also
Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY 7 (Sept. 26, 1977) (de-
scribing similar plan purportedly operated by Princeton), cited in Bakke, 433 U.S. at 317 n.51.  Use of
the term “purportedly” is not meant to suggest that the amici curiae were not, in fact, following the
Harvard Plan as described to the Court.  I mean only to emphasize that there were no factual findings
before the Court regarding the actual operation of the plans.
39. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (“In such an admissions program, race or ethnic background may be
deemed a ‘plus’ in a particular applicant’s file, yet it does not insulate the individual from comparison
with all other candidates for the available seats.  The file of a particular black applicant may be exam-
ined for his potential contribution to diversity without the factor of race being decisive when compared,
for example, with that of an applicant identified as an Italian-American if the latter is thought to exhibit
qualities more likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism.”); see also id. at 322 (“The Admis-
sions Committee, with only a few places left to fill, might find itself forced to choose between A, the
child of a successful black physician in an academic community with promise of superior academic per-
formance, and B, a black who grew up in an inner city ghetto of semi-literate parents whose academic
achievement was lower but who had demonstrated energy and leadership as well as an apparently
abiding interest in black power.  If a good number of black students much like A but few like B had al-
ready been admitted, the Committee might prefer B; and vice versa.  If C, a white student with extraor-
dinary artistic talent, were also seeking one of the remaining places, his unique quality might give him
an edge over both A and B.” (quoting Harvard College Admissions Program)).
40. See id. at 324.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 315-19.
43. See id. at 315-20.
44. See id. at 315-19.
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Justices who thought all preferences were inconsistent with Title VI, 45 Justice
Powell confined his condemnation to Davis’s quota scheme.  Therefore, as the
narrowest opinion supporting the judgment, Justice Powell’s opinion can prop-
erly be viewed as the “holding” of the case.46
While Bakke voided the only plan actually before the Court, proponents of
preferences spun the decision as a victory for race-conscious admissions poli-
cies.47  These advocates seized on Justice Powell’s approval of the sort of “plus
system” purportedly in place at Harvard and other Ivy League Schools, even
though this language was arguably dicta.48  After all, the judgment of the Cali-
fornia courts did not purport to ban any consideration of race in the admissions
process; instead, the courts simply ordered Davis to admit Bakke.49  Moreover,
Davis did not seek to defend a “plus system” like the Harvard plan in the lower
courts or the Supreme Court, but instead chose to stand up for its quota plan.
Only amici curiae placed a plus system before the Court.50  Thus, Justice Pow-
ell’s endorsement of a plus system was advisory in nature, approving an admis-
                                                          
45. See id. at 412-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
46. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977); John Hart Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977
Term—Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 9-10 n.33 (1978).  There is
one sense in which Justice Powell’s opinion was not the narrowest ground supporting the judgment.
After all, Justice Stevens refused to reach the constitutional question at all, reaching the same judgment
on purely statutory grounds.  One could argue that principles of judicial restraint require subsequent
courts to treat this non-constitutional rationale as the narrowest ground of the ruling, and thus as the
holding of the case, leaving the political branches free of judicial interference, at least in the short run.
Nonetheless, this essay will treat Justice Powell’s opinion as the opinion of the Court.  See Ashwander
v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring).
47. See Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 381, 386 (1998).  The Carter Admini-
stration, for instance, claimed that Justice Powell’s opinion validated the very type of preferences it had
encouraged as part of its administration of Title VI.  See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Pro-
grams; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg. 58,509, 58,510 (1979)
(“The Bakke Court affirmed the legality of voluntary affirmative action.”).
48. See Meese, supra note 47, at 382-86; Arval Morris, The Bakke Decision: One Holding or Two?,
58 OR. L. REV. 311, 326-32 (1979).
49. To be sure, the opinion of the California Supreme Court stated that schools could not take race
into account when making admissions decisions.  See Bakke v. The Regents of the Univ. of California,
553 P.2d 1152, 1166 (Cal. 1976) (“In short, the standards for admission employed by the University are
not constitutionally infirm except to the extent that they are utilized in a racially discriminatory man-
ner.  Disadvantaged applicants of all races must be eligible for sympathetic consideration, and no appli-
cant may be rejected because of his race, in favor of another who is less qualified, as measured by stan-
dards applied without regard to race.”).  Moreover, the California Supreme Court remanded the case
to the lower court with orders that Bakke be considered for admission without regard to his race.
However, in its petition for rehearing to the California Supreme Court, the state conceded that Davis
would have admitted Bakke but for its quota plan.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 280-81.  The California Su-
preme Court then narrowed its judgment, ordering simply that Davis admit Bakke.  This amended,
limited judgment did not by its terms preclude Davis from using a non-quota system of racial prefer-
ence in future cases.  Because the state only sought certiorari from this amended judgment, the question
whether Davis could employ non-quota schemes such as a plus system was simply not before the Court.
The Supreme Court reviews judgments, not opinions, and the judgment of the California Supreme
Court did not purport to outlaw a plus system.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 409-11 (Stevens, J. concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Meese, supra note 47, at 383-84; see also California v.
Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987) (holding that the Court “reviews judgments, not statements in opin-
ions”); Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033, 1033 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring in
denial of certiorari) (“[T]his Court, however reviews judgments, not opinions.”).
50. See Meese, supra note 47, at 384-85.
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sions system operated only by parties not even before the Court.51  Neverthe-
less, the political branches and the academy treated this portion of the opinion
as a holding that validated Harvard-like admissions policies.
Like previous administrations and the academy, the Clinton Administration
has embraced Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, at least rhetorically.  In a 1995
Memorandum to Agency General Counsels, the Office of Legal Counsel cited
Justice Powell’s opinion with approval, endorsing the language approving the
Harvard Plan as a holding that supported the use of preferences in various non-
remedial contexts.52  Moreover, when the Fifth Circuit opined that Bakke was
no longer good law,53 the Administration disagreed, advising colleges, universi-
ties, and the Supreme Court that Justice Powell’s “landmark opinion” approv-
ing preferences was still the law.54
As discussed infra, reality does not match the Administration’s rhetoric.  To
be sure, various agencies have given lip service to Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke, invoking it to establish the propriety of racial preferences in a variety of
contexts.  As noted earlier, however, any language in Justice Powell’s opinion
approving preferences was arguably dicta, addressing, as it did, a plan that was
not before the Court.  At any rate, even if viewed as a holding, Justice Powell’s
opinion does not purport to approve all non-quota preferences.  Instead, Justice
Powell endorsed only a particular system of preferences—a system that pursued
diversity consistently and provided applicants for admission individualized con-
sideration.  Nevertheless, while allegedly relying on this opinion, federal agen-
cies have often failed to adhere to its terms in practice, implementing and ap-
proving programs of racial preference that do not comport with Justice Powell’s
opinion.  Thus, the Administration sought to “have its cake and eat it too”—
pursuing and encouraging problematic racial preferences while avoiding the
political costs that accompany explicit defiance of the Court.  While such a
policy may appear advantageous in the short run, it short-circuits the inter-
branch dialogue that usually results from executive defiance of Supreme Court
decisions.  By treating language that is arguably dicta as the “last word” on the
permissibility of preferences, the Administration has abdicated its responsibility
to engage with the Court over the meaning of the Constitution.  Without such a
dialogue and concomitant reconsideration of Bakke by the Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Powell’s opinion will remain “on the books,” giving courts and future ad-
                                                          
51. See id. at 385 (describing Justice Powell’s approval of a plus system as “in essence an advisory
opinion”).  Cf. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752 , 761 n.7 (1984) (Powell, J.) (re-
fusing to consider argument raised by United States as amicus curiae because “neither party before this
Court presses the argument”).
52. See Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum to General Counsels, Legal Guidance on the Impli-
cations of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena (June 28, 1995) [herein-
after Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum].
53. See Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944-46 (5th Cir. 1996).
54. See Letter from Judith A. Winston, Office of Civil Rights, Department of Education, to Col-
lege and University Counsel (July 30, 1996); see also Brief of The United States as Amicus Curiae for
the State of Texas, at 12-13, Texas v. Hopwood, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996) (No. 95-1773) (“Bakke’s land-
mark holding has guided admissions policies of public and private institutions of higher education.”).
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ministrations a convenient vehicle for nullifying the type of diversity-based
preferences the Clinton Administration has embraced.
III
BAKKE MIS(APPLIED)
Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion does not purport to justify racial preferences
in all contexts.  It does not, for instance, justify race-conscious decisionmaking
in awarding highway contracts.  Still, Bakke may conceivably apply beyond the
realm of university admissions, justifying racial preferences that are necessary
to promote a robust exchange of ideas in other contexts.  Below, I examine the
Administration’s reliance on Bakke to justify various racial preferences in two
contexts—communications and education.  In each instance, it is submitted, the
Administration has misapplied Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.
A. Preferences in Broadcasting
In 1978, the Federal Communications Commission (“the Commission” or
the “FCC”) announced a series of measures designed to increase minority own-
ership of broadcast facilities.55  First, the Commission resolved to accord minor-
ity applicants a “plus” or “boost” when allocating scarce broadcast frequencies
in  “comparative licensing proceedings.”56  Second, the Commission created a
policy of awarding tax certificates to licensees that sold or otherwise transferred
control of their broadcast authority to minority-owned broadcasters.57  Finally,
the Commission promulgated a so-called “distress sale” policy under which li-
censees who had arguably violated their public interest obligations could avoid
forfeiture of their licenses by selling them to minorities so long as the sale price
was significantly below the license’s fair market value.58  The Commission justi-
fied these race-conscious measures on the ground that they would enhance the
                                                          
55. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d 979
(1978).  Previously the Commission had taken the position that such preferences were not advisable.
See Mid-Florida Television Corp. 33 F.C.C.2d 1, 17-18 (Rev. Bd.), rev. denied, 37 F.C.C.2d 559 (1972).
The D.C. Circuit disagreed, however, and directed the Commission to take action to further minority
participation in broadcasting.  See T.V. 9 v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also Communica-
tion Center v. FCC, 463 F.2d 822, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
56. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 982-
83; see also WPIX, Inc., 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 411-12 (1978) (stating that “minority ownership and participa-
tion is also an affirmative factor enhancing the applicant’s proposal and raising its level in the compara-
tive evaluation”); Atlass Communications, Inc. (WJPC), 61 F.C.C.2d 995, 996-97 (1976).  See generally
THOMAS KRATTENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 93-101 (1998) (describing sys-
tem of comparative licensing); Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393,
394-95 (1965).
57. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 983.
In so doing, the Commission acted pursuant to its statutory authority to issue tax certificates whenever
“necessary or appropriate to effectuate a change in policy of, or the adoption of a new policy by, the
Commission with respect to the ownership and control of radio broadcasting stations.”  Id. at 983 n.19
(quoting 26 U.S.C. § 1071).
58. See id. at 983; see also Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 558 (stating that distress sale price must
not exceed 75% of the market value).
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diversity of voices and viewpoints broadcast over the nation’s airwaves.59  The
D.C. Circuit upheld the use of race as a plus factor in comparative licensing
proceedings against a Fifth Amendment challenge, relying heavily upon Justice
Powell’s opinion in  Bakke.60
The Supreme Court reviewed the distress sale and comparative license poli-
cies in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.61  Asserting that Congress had expressly
authorized these two policies, the Court subjected them to intermediate scru-
tiny.62  More precisely, the Court asked whether the policies were “substantially
related” to the achievement of important governmental objectives.63
Relying heavily on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, the Court sustained
both programs over a vigorous dissent by Justice O’Connor.64  Assurance of di-
verse voices on the Nation’s airwaves, the Court said, would promote First
Amendment values by furthering the “right” of listeners to receive a wide vari-
ety of viewpoints.65  Thus, the Court reasoned, enhancing broadcast diversity
was “at the very least an important governmental objective”66—directly analo-
gous to the objective of “a robust exchange of ideas” furthered by a “diverse
student body.”67  The Court also found that the distress sale and comparative
licensing policies “substantially” furthered the “important” interest in promot-
ing broadcast diversity.68
Then came Adarand.69  In 1995, the Court entertained a challenge to racial
preferences for federal funding of interstate highway construction.  In an opin-
ion by Justice O’Connor, the Court repudiated Metro Broadcasting’s conclusion
that “benign” racial preferences approved by Congress should receive interme-
diate scrutiny.70  Instead, the Court said, such preferences should receive strict
scrutiny, the same scrutiny accorded preferences adopted by state and local
                                                          
59. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broadcasting Facilities, 68 F.C.C.2d at 980-
82; see also T.V. 9, Inc., 495 F.2d at 937-38; In re Waters Broadcasting Corp., 91 F.C.C.2d 1260, 1264-65
(1982).
60. See West Michigan Broadcast Co. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 601, 614-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“The FCC
policy would clearly be validated under Justice Powell’s approach [in Bakke], which had endorsed a
rationale very similar to that offered here by the FCC.”).
61. 497 U.S. 547 (1990); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the Fifth
Amendment contains an equal protection component).
62. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 563-66 (“[B]enign race-conscious measures mandated by
Congress-even if those measures are not remedial in the sense of being designed to compensate victims
of past governmental or societal discrimination-are constitutionally permissible to the extent they serve
important governmental objectives within the power of Congress and are substantially related to
achievement of those objectives.”); see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 3 TREATISE
ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 18.3, at 218-21 (1999) (describing so-called intermediate scrutiny under
equal protection clause); id. at 219 n.16 (characterizing opinion in Metro Broadcasting as an example of
intermediate scrutiny).
63. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-65.
64. See id. at 567-601.
65. See id. at 567-68.
66. Id. at 567.
67. Id. at 568 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-13 (Powell, J.)).
68. See id. at 569-79.
69. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
70. Id. at 225-27.
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governments.71  In so doing, the Court took great pains to emphasize that appli-
cation of strict scrutiny would not result in nullification of all “benign” race-
conscious programs.72  Unfortunately, the Court did not actually evaluate the
program before it; thus, the Adarand opinion adds little, if anything, to the con-
tent of strict scrutiny analysis.73
Despite its disapproval of Metro Broadcasting’s decision to apply intermedi-
ate scrutiny, Adarand did not by its own terms call the FCC’s racial preferences
into question.74  Certainly, a neutral observer “counting votes” would predict
that such preferences would receive a hostile reception from the current
Court—the four dissenters in Metro Broadcasting remain on the Court, and
each joined the Adarand majority.75  Moreover, Justice Thomas, who joined the
Court after Metro Broadcasting and also joined the Adarand majority, ex-
pressed his disapproval of the FCC’s gender-based preferences before joining
the Court.76
Nevertheless, the duty of the Executive Branch is not simply to predict what
courts will do:  It must instead make its own independent judgment about the
meaning of the Constitution.77  Since Adarand, the Clinton Administration has
done just that, taking the position that the preferences involved in Metro
Broadcasting are constitutional, even when analyzed under the strict scrutiny
standard adopted in Adarand.78  In so doing, the Administration has relied on
Bakke, and Justice Powell’s determination that the promotion of “diversity” is a
compelling interest.  As shown below, the preferences embraced by the Ad-
ministration do not find shelter in Bakke and are instead plainly unconstitu-
tional under that decision.
As noted earlier, the FCC’s racial preferences once took three forms: (1) a
“plus” accorded minority applications during comparative licensing proceed-
ings, (2) tax certificates for licensees who transferred broadcast authority to mi-
norities, and (3) the “distress sale” policy.79  Just three months before Adarand,
                                                          
71. See id. at 218-31.
72. See id. at 237 (“[W]e wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory, but fatal in
fact.’” (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)).  See generally David A. Strauss, Af-
firmative Action and The Public Interest, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (concluding that “strict scrutiny” applied
to “benign” race-conscious programs is less exacting than that applied to race-conscious programs that
burden minorities).
73. See Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of Supreme
Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 677 (1996).
74. See id. at 708-11 (arguing that “[t]he FCC diversity preference, although a tougher sell, may
also survive the Adarand decision”).
75. Justice O’Connor authored the lead dissent in Metro Broadcasting.  Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Kennedy all joined that dissent, as well as the majority opinion in Adarand.
76. See Lamprecht v. F.C.C., 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Thomas, J.) (voiding consideration of
gender during comparative licensing proceedings).
77. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.  But compare Presidential Authority to Decline to
Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 200 (“As a general matter, if the Presi-
dent believes that the Court would sustain a particular provision as constitutional, the President should
execute the statute, not withstanding his own beliefs about the constitutional issue.”).
78. See infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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however, Congress eliminated the tax certificate program, albeit over the
Commission’s objection.80  This left in place two racial preference programs—
the distress sale policy and comparative licensing policy.81
Despite congressional indifference or even downright hostility, the Commis-
sion did not repeal the distress sale policy or the policy according minorities a
“plus” in comparative licensing proceedings.82  Moreover, the Chairman of the
Commission called for a renewal of the tax certificate program, in a speech that
did not mention Adarand.83  The Clinton Administration did nothing to dis-
courage this position and, if anything, has encouraged it.  More precisely,
shortly after Adarand, the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) produced a
lengthy memorandum advising agency general counsel of the legal implications
of the decision.84  The memorandum accepted Adarand’s decision to apply strict
scrutiny but opined that enhancing diversity of viewpoints on the nation’s air-
waves constituted a compelling state interest that would justify the racial pref-
erences approved in Metro Broadcasting.85  Adarand, OLC said, did not men-
tion or question Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.86  Indeed, OLC argued,
Justice O’Connor, the author of Adarand, had previously expressed her ap-
proval of Justice Powell’s opinion.87
More recently, the Administration reiterated its assertion that racial prefer-
ences in broadcasting satisfy the strict scrutiny mandated by Adarand.  In Lu-
theran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC,88 the Department of Justice, as amicus
curiae, sought to defend Commission regulations requiring broadcast licensees
to pursue equal employment opportunity hiring policies.  Although the Admini-
stration claimed that such regulations were “race neutral,” and thus not subject
                                                          
80. See Deduction for Health Insurance Costs of Self-Employed Individuals, Pub. L. No. 104-7, §2,
109 Stat. 93, 93-94 (1995) (codified at 26 U.S.C. 1071 (1994)); see also Statement of FCC General Coun-
sel William E. Kennard, 1995 F.C.C. Lexis 1550 (1995) (endorsing tax certificate program and arguing
that it is constitutional under Metro Broadcasting).  Mr. Kennard is now Chairman of the Commission.
81. Congress recently directed the Commission to award most broadcast licenses through an auc-
tion system in lieu of the comparative licensing process.  See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, §
3002(a)(1)(A), 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (1997).  Nevertheless, the Commission retains authority to engage in
comparative licensing proceedings with respect to licenses for “digital television service given to exist-
ing terrestrial broadcast licensees to replace their analog television service licenses.”  47 U.S.C. §
309(j)(2)(B).  Moreover, the Commission is considering a credits system that will enhance the prospect
of minority bidders to prevail when auctions do take place.  See Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act–Competitive Bidding for Commercial Broadcast and Instructional Television
Fixed Service Licenses, 12 F.C.C.R. 22363, 22399-400 (1997).
82. See Trinity Broadcasting of Florida, Inc., 1999 F.C.C. Lexis 1591 (1999) (applying minority
ownership policy).
83. See FCC Chief Makes Pitch to Revive Minority Tax Incentive Program, ATLANTA J. CONST.,
June 18, 1999, at H3.
84. See Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, supra note 52.
85. See id. at 20-21.
86. See id. at 20.
87. See id. (discussing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (O’Connor, J. concur-
ring)).  But see Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J. dissenting) (“In sum, the FCC has
not met its burden even under the Court’s test that approves of racial classifications that are substan-
tially related to an important governmental objective.  Of course, the programs even more clearly fail
the strict scrutiny that should be applied.”).
88. 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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to strict scrutiny, it argued in the alternative that the regulations were “narrowly
tailored” to encourage stations to hire more minorities and thus advanced the
compelling state interest of broadcast diversity.89  In so doing, the Department
relied explicitly on Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.90  Similar reasoning, of
course would validate FCC policies designed to promote racial diversity in the
ownership of broadcast licenses.
Close inspection suggests that, far from supporting the Administration’s po-
sition on racial preferences in broadcasting, Bakke actually requires repeal of
such programs.  Consider the distress sale policy:  Under this program, licensees
may avoid forfeiture of their licenses for misconduct if they agree to sell their
licenses to minorities, and no one else.91  The program is not a “plus system”; it
instead confers financial benefits—the ability to purchase a valuable commodity
below market price—on minorities, period.  To be sure, the minorities in ques-
tion must be qualified, and two or more minorities might compete for the li-
cense.  This was equally true of the Davis quota system, however.  As Professor
Paul Mishkin, co-author of Davis’s brief in Bakke, has argued, the distress sale
policy “ma[k]e[s] race an absolute gateway to special consideration” and thus
would not survive scrutiny under Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.92
This does not mean that race-conscious communications policies can never
survive the strict scrutiny mandated by Adarand.  Programs such as the com-
parative licensing system and the tax certificate policy seem less problematic, as
both merely make race a single “plus” factor affecting the allocation of li-
censes.93  Nevertheless, there is a more fundamental flaw with the distress sale,
tax certificate, and comparative licensing policies, a flaw that should cause the
Commission to abjure all three programs.  Unlike the race-conscious admissions
plan that Justice Powell blessed in Bakke, none of the preference policies em-
ployed by the FCC pursues or even attempts to pursue diversity in a consistent
                                                          
89. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae for the Federal Communications Commission
at 26-34, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (No. 97-1116).
90. See id. at 27.
91. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
92. See Paul Mishkin, Foreword: The Making of a Turning Point-Metro and Adarand, 84 CAL. L.
REV. 875, 883 (1996) (“[I]t seems fair to say that, . . . under Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, the ‘dis-
tress sale’ program would have fallen for the same reason that the Davis Medical School program was
held invalid.  Rather than a plus in an overall individual evaluation, it made race an absolute gateway to
special consideration and possible preferential treatment.”).  That the distress sale policy applied to
“only a small fraction of broadcast licenses” is not significant.  Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 598-99
(claiming that distress sale policy was “narrowly tailored” for this reason).  As one scholar noted,
Bakke did not turn on the number of seats reserved by the quota system, but instead upon the lack of
individualized consideration that characterized the Davis plan.  See Neal Devins, Requiem for a
Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 135 n.76 (1990) (“It is preposterous to suggest that the distress sale
preference is indistinguishable in kind from the comparative hearing preference because it applies ‘only
with respect to a small fraction of broadcast licenses.’ [quoting Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 598-99.]
Justice Powell’s distinction of the Davis and Harvard plan in Bakke had nothing to do with the size of
the Davis quota.  It had everything to do with the nature of the quota, that is, the reservation of slots
only for minority students.”).
93. See Mishkin, supra note 92, at 883 (arguing that “the program of enhancement for minorities in
comparative proceedings might have passed muster under Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke”).
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or uniform manner.94  No tax certificates have ever been available for licensees
who sell to religious fundamentalists, libertarians, socialists, or individuals from
other groups whose views are decidedly underrepresented on the nation’s air-
waves.95  Similarly, the Commission’s distress sale policy allows for sales only to
racial minorities, and not to members of other underrepresented groups.  Fi-
nally, unlike the “Harvard Plan” approved by Justice Powell in Bakke, which
accorded a “plus” for any number of diversity characteristics, the system of
comparative licensing provides a “plus” for only one diversity factor:  race.96
The failure to pursue diversity consistently casts serious constitutional doubt
on the FCC’s distress sale and comparative licensing policies, and also on the
race-conscious policies the Commission previously pursued.97  For purposes of
strict scrutiny analysis, it is well-settled that failure to pursue an interest consis-
tently undermines any assertion that the interest is “compelling.”98  Indeed, as
noted earlier, Justice Powell relied on this principle explicitly in Bakke, voiding
the Davis quota scheme because it pursued only racial diversity simpliciter.99
The reasons for this rule should be obvious.  If the state refuses to pursue a
purported objective “across the board,” but instead does so only by interfering
with protected rights or creating suspect classifications, a presumption naturally
arises that the state does not, in fact, believe the interest is compelling, but is in-
stead pursuing some other objective.100  In the case of broadcast preferences, the
                                                          
94. See Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 621 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[O]f all the varied tradi-
tions and ideas shared among our citizens, the FCC has sought to amplify only those particular views it
identifies through classifications most suspect under equal protection doctrine.”).
95. See Timothy L. Hall, Educational Diversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 585-
91 (1998); Eugene Volokh, Diversity, Race As Proxy, And Religion As Proxy, 43 UCLA L. REV. 2059,
2070-76 (1996); see also Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 141 F.3d at 350 (“[R]eligious affiliation, a
matter of affirmative intellectual and spiritual decision, is far more likely to affect programming than
skin color.”).
96. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.  Race is only one factor the Commission consid-
ers in comparative licensing proceedings.  See West Michigan Broadcast Co., 735 F.2d at 615 (claiming
that the comparative licensing process satisfies Bakke because it allows for consideration of numerous
“traits to assess an applicant’s potential for increasing diversity and quality of programming”).  Still, a
program does not pass muster simply because it employs race as one of several factors, most of which
have nothing to do with diversity.  Instead, at a minimum, the program must make some effort to pur-
sue diversity consistently.  The Commission, apparently, has only considered “traits” that bear on racial
diversity.
97. See Shurberg Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902, 924-25 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Sil-
berman, J.), rev’d sub nom. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
98. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546-47 (1993); First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 793 (1978) (Powell, J.).
99. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (“The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encom-
passes a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a
single though important element.”); see also Hopwood, 78 F.3d. at 965-66 (Wiener, J., concurring)
(stating that pursuit of racial diversity simpliciter does not satisfy Bakke).
100. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546-47 (“Where government restricts only
conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible measures to restrict other con-
duct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of
the restriction is not compelling.”); First National Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 792-94 (rejecting the as-
sertion that prohibition of corporate speech during referenda campaigns served the “compelling inter-
est” of protecting shareholders where state failed to regulate corporate speech in other contexts);
Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
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FCC’s failure to pursue “diversity” consistently suggests that the Commission is
pursuing a racial “spoils system,” attempting to promote particular viewpoints,
or both.101  If, as the Administration claims, Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke is
“the law” where diversity-based racial preferences are concerned, then the FCC
must dismantle its distress sale policy.  It must also refrain from pursuing other
policies that advance racial diversity “for its own sake.”102
B. Preferences In Education
The FCC is not the only federal agency that has defied Bakke during the
Clinton Administration.  The Department of Education followed a similar
course.  As noted earlier, the Department embraced Justice Powell’s opinion in
Bakke as a “landmark.”103  Still, exercising its authority to administer Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Department blessed or encouraged racial pref-
erences that were plainly inconsistent with Justice Powell’s opinion.
1.  Admissions.  Unlike, for example, the State of California, the federal
government does not directly administer colleges and universities.104
Nevertheless, the federal government does provide substantial financial aid for
higher education, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids racial
discrimination by institutions that receive such aid.  In Bakke, five Justices
agreed that, despite its plain language, Title VI only forbids those preferences
that if adopted by a public institution would offend the Fourteenth
Amendment.105
The Department of Education is responsible for administering Title VI, and
a finding by the Department that a college or university is engaged in discrimi-
natory practices can deprive the school of federal money.  Thus, the Depart-
ment occasionally reviews preference programs administered by schools that
receive federal funds.  In 1997, the Department’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”
or “the Office”) completed a thorough review of UCLA’s admissions policies,
including its affirmative action plan.106  Under the plan, UCLA admissions offi-
                                                          
judgment) (“[A] law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the highest order,’ . . . when it
leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.”).
101. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315; Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 617 (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court has never upheld a broadcasting measure designed to amplify a distinct set of views or
the views of a particular class of speakers.”); Strauss, supra note 72, at 1 (arguing that the Court’s af-
firmative action jurisprudence is designed to identify and void preference programs that are simply spe-
cial interest transfers); see also National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943)
(“Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among applicants upon the basis of their po-
litical, economic or social views, or upon any other capricious basis.”).
102. See Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, supra note 52, at 3 (“To the extent that affirmative
action is used to foster racial and ethnic diversity, the government must seek some further objective
beyond the achievement of diversity itself.”).
103. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae for The State of Texas at 12-13, Texas v. Hop-
wood, 518 U.S. 1033 (5th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1773).
104. The military academies are, of course, an exception.
105. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 284-87 (Powell, J.); id. at 328-41 (Brennan, J. concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part).
106. See Letter from John E. Palomino, Regional Civil Rights Director, to Charles E. Young, Chan-
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cials assigned each applicant two scores.  The first score was based solely on an
assessment of the applicant’s academic potential.107  Applicants received scores
of one through five, with one being the highest.  The second “supplemental
score” was based on a student’s race, disadvantage, and residence.108  Member-
ship in racial and ethnic groups that were “historically underrepresented” at
UCLA earned a significant boost in an applicant’s supplemental score, while
membership in groups that had been better represented resulted in a smaller
boost.109  White individuals received no boost for their ethnicity.  Finally, no
boost was given for special talents, political views, unique experience, or relig-
ious beliefs.
Individuals with academic scores of one were admitted, regardless of their
supplemental scores, without further consideration.  Moreover, California resi-
dents with academic scores of two or higher were admitted, again without con-
sideration of their supplemental scores.  Taken together, these two groups ac-
counted for sixty percent of the applicants admitted.110  Admissions officials
then combined the academic and supplemental scores to obtain one composite
score.  Individuals with a sufficiently high composite score were admitted with-
out any further consideration.111  So, for instance, individuals who were mem-
bers of underrepresented minority groups, and thus entitled to high supplemen-
tal scores, were automatically admitted if they possessed a sufficiently high
academic score.  These individuals made up about thirty percent of the admit-
ted student body.
UCLA officials then gave consideration to the remaining applicants by
means of the “read process.”  Under this process, evaluators reviewed individ-
ual files to determine whether “the applicant could succeed academically at
UCLA.”112  In doing so, evaluators considered factors such as “special interests,
talents and experiences.”113  UCLA made offers to about one thousand such
students, or about ten percent of the total admitted.114
The process just described produced the entire entering class for the fall of
1990.  The process did not end there, however.  Instead, UCLA also offered 645
students deferred admission for the Winter 1991 semester.115  This cohort,
known as the “Winter Group,” was composed solely of students with a combi-
nation of high supplemental scores and strong, but not spectacular, academic
                                                          
cellor, University of California at Los Angeles (Oct. 9, 1997).
107. See id. at 4-5.
108. See id. at 5.
109. See id. at 6.
110. See id. at 7.
111. See id. (“In the next step of the admissions process, students were admitted based upon a com-
bination of academic and supplemental rank.  These students did not receive academic ratings as high
as [the first 60% admitted], but because of high supplemental scores, were . . . admitted.”).
112. Id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.  Why positions were open in the winter quarter semester that were not open in the fall is
unclear.  Perhaps some students admitted in the fall would drop out after one semester.
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rankings.116  UCLA did not consider students with low or non-existent supple-
mental scores for inclusion in this group.
OCR found that UCLA’s admissions program passed muster under Justice
Powell’s opinion in Bakke.117  The Office emphasized that the plan contained no
quotas and claimed that each applicant competed for all slots in the entering
class.118  Moreover, the Office found that the consideration of race as a “plus
factor” was “narrowly tailored” to further the school’s interest in diversity.119
Finally, the Office asserted that race was only one of seventeen factors that
UCLA considered, thus suggesting that the school was pursuing several forms
of diversity, and not just racial diversity simpliciter.120
OCR’s application of Bakke does not withstand scrutiny.  First, the UCLA
program fails Bakke’s individualized consideration requirement.121  For exam-
ple, in constructing the Winter group, students with an academic rank of 2.5
were offered deferred admission automatically if they were members of certain
racial groups, disadvantaged, or residents of certain parts of California.  This
group of applicants was not compared to those of students with special talents,
experiences, and backgrounds:  Students with these diversity characteristics who
possessed academic ranks of 2.5 or even higher were simply ineligible for inclu-
sion in this group, regardless of the uniqueness of their characteristics.  Thus,
the process of constructing the Winter group insulated certain minorities from
comparison with non-minorities who themselves possessed diversity characteris-
tics in addition to similar or even better academic qualifications.  The latter
group was simply excluded altogether from consideration for inclusion in the
Winter Group.  The insulation of some students from comparison with others
rebuts OCR’s assertion that all applicants could compete for all spots in the en-
tering class and plainly offends Bakke’s requirement of individualized consid-
eration.122
                                                          
116. See id.
117. See id. at 10-12.
118. See id. at 12.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 10-11.
121. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing Bakke’s requirement of individualized
consideration).
122. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (concluding that a plus system is superior to a quota system because
the former “does not insulate the individual from comparison will all other candidates for the available
seats”).  “In short [a plus system] is flexible enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in
light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to place them on the same footing for con-
sideration.”  Id. “The applicant who loses out on the last available seat to another candidate receiving a
‘plus’ on the basis of ethnic background will not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that
seat simply because he was not the right color or had the wrong surname.  It would mean only that his
combined qualifications, which may have included similar nonobjective factors, did not outweigh those
of the other applicant.  His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competitively, and he
would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 318.
This requirement was clear to those who read Justice Powell’s opinion closely.  For instance, Professor
Archibald Cox, who argued in support of Davis in the Supreme Court, concluded that Justice Powell’s
opinion mandated individual consideration of all applicants.  See Archibald Cox, Minority Admissions
after Bakke, reprinted in THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION, BAKKE, WEBER AND AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 80, 101 (1979) (“[A]n admissions program almost surely will fail to survive judicial scrutiny
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Second, shortcomings also infected the general admissions process em-
ployed to admit students in the fall.  Here, again, minority students with certain
academic qualifications were admitted automatically, as were students deemed
“disadvantaged.”  Such admission occurred without any comparison to students
with special talents, experiences, or viewpoints, even if such students possessed
the very same academic qualifications or qualifications superior to those indi-
viduals who were admitted automatically.  While evaluators surely considered
such talents during the “read process,” this process did not allow admissions of-
ficers to compare the applications of students with special talents, experiences,
or viewpoints to the applications of minorities and others who had already been
admitted.  Like the process employed to construct the Winter Group, this proc-
ess insulated minority applicants from competition with candidates who did not
possess the characteristics that entitled applicants to a positive supplemental
score.
Third, UCLA’s admissions process also suffered from a separate flaw,
namely, a failure to pursue diversity in a consistent fashion.  Although OCR
claimed that the UCLA system considered seventeen different factors, careful
inspection suggests that there was less to such consideration than meets the eye.
To begin with, nine of the factors were unrelated to diversity but were instead
indicia of potential academic performance.123  This left only eight other “diver-
sity factors”: race, socioeconomic, educational, or physical disadvantage, resi-
dency, special talents, interests, or experiences.124  Putting aside the question of
whether each of these factors is analytically distinct, consideration of such fac-
tors hardly constitutes a consistent pursuit of diversity as Justice Powell em-
ployed that term in Bakke.  For instance, there is no indication that UCLA con-
sidered the political views of its applicants.125  Further, the plan made no effort
to achieve religious diversity among the student body.126  Finally, while the plan
purported to consider the “residence” of applicants, preference for residence
was given only to California residents.  For example, applicants from Iowa,
Alaska, or New Hampshire apparently received no “plus,” contrary to the Har-
vard Plan Justice Powell endorsed in Bakke.127  UCLA’s failure to consider
                                                          
[under Bakke] if it leaves the appraisal of minority applicants to a special committee without true com-
parison of the merits of individual applicants. . . .  The requirement surely turns on substance, not on
form.”).
123. See Letter from John E. Palomino, supra note 106, at 10.
124. See id.  Moreover, it is not clear that UCLA considered these factors for the purpose of en-
hancing diversity.  For instance, OCR found that UCLA considered “special talents, interests or expe-
riences” for the purpose of determining “whether the applicant could succeed academically at UCLA.”
See id. at 7 (emphasis added).  Thus, while race and socioeconomic advantage operated in an individ-
ual’s favor independent of predictions of academic success,  “special talents,” for instance, may have
had no such independent weight.
125. Cf. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324 (quoting Harvard plan for proposition that “an abiding interest in
Black Power” was an important diversity characteristic).
126. Cf. Bowen, supra note 38, at 9 (“[A] great deal of learning occurs informally.  It occurs through
interactions among students of both sexes; of different races, religions and backgrounds.” (emphasis
added), quoted in Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312-313 n. 48 (Powell, J.)).
127. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 322-23.
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these three rather obvious and probative diversity characteristics calls into
question any assertion that “student diversity” is a compelling state interest.128
Thus, although it invoked Bakke as support for the constitutionality of racial
preferences, OCR actually refused to follow Justice Powell’s opinion in prac-
tice.
2.  Scholarships.  Colleges and universities have relied upon Bakke to justify
race-conscious admissions policies.  Some have gone even further, however,
relying on Justice Powell’s opinion to support and defend race-conscious
decisions in the process of awarding financial aid.  Indeed, many schools have
even created scholarships for which only minorities are eligible.129  At the very
least, such policies raise serious questions under the Equal Protection Clause
and Bakke itself.130
In 1991, the Bush Administration sought to answer these questions.  OCR
issued a notice of proposed rulemaking pursuant to its authority to implement
Title VI.  Noting Bakke’s conclusion that the standards emanating from Title VI
were coextensive with those of the Fourteenth Amendment, OCR opined that
any race-conscious distribution of scholarship monies had to comply with deci-
sion in Bakke.131  Applying Justice Powell’s opinion in what seemed to be a
                                                          
128. Cf. First National Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 793 (rejecting assertion that ban on corporate
speech during referendum was justified as shareholder protection measure where state had not out-
lawed other forms of corporate speech that were equally offensive to shareholders).  The Bush Admini-
stration reached a similar conclusion, finding that the admissions process employed by Boalt Hall Law
School offended Title VI because the process pursued racial diversity simpliciter, and not other forms
of diversity.  See Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Regional Civil Rights Director Office For Civil Rights,
United States Department of Education, to Dr. Chang-Lin Tien, at 2-4 (Sept. 25, 1992); see also Vo-
lokh, supra note 95, at 2075 (“Religion says much more about the experiences, outlooks, and ideas that
a person brings than does being a musician, a chess player, or a French speaker.  It might even say more
than, or at least as much as, race or geographical background or even ‘exceptional personal talents,
unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity, demonstrated compassion, a history
of overcoming disadvantage, [or] ability to communicate with the poor.’”).
129. Many schools openly tout such set-asides on their internet web sites.  For instance, the Univer-
sity of Iowa awards numerous scholarships available only to certain minorities, including the Opportu-
nity at Iowa Scholarships (reserved for students who are “African American, Hispanic/Latino(a), Na-
tive American/American Indian, or Alaskan Native,”) Iowa Minority Academic Grants for Economic
Success (IMAGES) (reserved for students who are “African American, Hispanic/Latino(a), Asian, Pa-
cific Islander, Native American/American Indian, or Alaskan Native”), University of Iowa Black
Alumni Scholarship (reserved for students of “Afro-American heritage”), and  the Minority American
Science Scholarship (reserved for U.S. citizens who are “African American, Hispanic/Latino(a), Native
American/American Indian, or refugee Southeast Asian”).  See Scholarships at the University of Iowa
(visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.uiowa.edu/financial-aid/schol1.htm>.  Further, the University of
Michigan reserves various scholarships for minorities, including the Martin Luther King, Jr., Scholar-
ship, the Michigan Scholar Award, the National Achievement Scholarship, and the Michigan Achieve-
ment Award Community College Transfer Scholarship.  See Miscellaneous (Other) Scholarships (vis-
ited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.finaid.umich.edu/othersch.htm>.  Also, Ohio State University has
created a Minority Scholars Program, which awards scholarships “on a competitive basis to members of
the following ethnic minority groups: African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and American In-
dian/Alaska Native.”  See Costs and Scholarship Opportunities (visited Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www-
afa.adm.ohio-state.edu/apps/fresh/cost_fin.html>.
130. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
Proposed Policy Guidance, 56 Fed. Reg. 64548 (1991).
131. See id. at 64548-49.
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straightforward manner, OCR proposed that colleges and universities could not
employ race-specific scholarships, but could consider race as a “plus factor”
when awarding such aid.132
OCR’s proposed rule created an uproar as well as more than 600 written
comments.133  The Bush Administration took no further action on the rulemak-
ing, and President Clinton took office in 1993.  After considering the comments
engendered by the 1991 notice, OCR issued a final rule, which departed from
the proposed rule in one important respect:  The Clinton Administration al-
lowed schools to create and employ race-specific scholarships.134
The Administration’s endorsement of race-specific scholarships seems to
squarely contradict Bakke.  While OCR did not expressly address this apparent
conflict, the “Legal Analysis” supporting the Policy Guidance did suggest sev-
eral bases for ignoring Bakke’s injunction against set-asides.  For instance, OCR
claimed that, unlike admission quotas, scholarship quotas do not, by them-
selves, exclude any individual from a college or university.135  Moreover, unlike
spaces in an entering class, the amount of financial aid available to students is
not necessarily fixed:  Some donors might contribute to a college’s financial aid
pool only if they were allowed to target the money to racial minorities.136  Fi-
nally, OCR argued that, unlike the admissions quotas in Bakke, scholarship
quotas might be narrowly tailored, that is, strictly necessary to achieve racial di-
versity.  Some schools, OCR opined, might have a reputation for being “inhos-
pitable to minority students,” thus necessitating such aid.137  The availability of
such aid can thus serve as a recruitment tool, encouraging racial minorities to
consider the school.  Further, such scholarships can encourage students to ac-
cept an offer of admission.138  Also, OCR claimed that such aid can “assist col-
leges in retaining students until they complete their program of studies.”139
None of these arguments in support of scholarship quotas withstands scru-
tiny under Justice Powell’s opinion.  To be sure, denying an applicant financial
aid because of his or her race does not ipso facto exclude that person from the
school in question; often individuals can pay their own tuition and living ex-
                                                          
132. See id. at 64548.
133. See Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Program; Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;
Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. 8756, 8756 (1994).
134. See id.
135. See id at 8762 (“The affirmative action admissions program struck down in Bakke had the ef-
fect of excluding applicants from the University on the basis of their race.  The use of race-targeted fi-
nancial aid, on the other hand, does not, in and of itself, dictate that a student would be foreclosed from
attending a college solely on the basis of race.”).
136. See id. (“A college’s receipt of privately donated monies restricted to an underrepresented
group might increase the total pool of funds for student aid in a situation in which, absent the ability to
impose such a limitation, the donor might not provide any aid at all.”).
137. See id. at 8761 (“Commenters argued that a college—because of its location, its reputation
(whether deserved or not) of being inhospitable to minority students, or its number of minority gradu-
ates—may be unable to recruit sufficient minority applicants even if race or national origin is consid-
ered a positive factor in admissions and the award of aid.”).
138. See id.
139. See id.
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penses.  In reality, however, some individuals cannot pay their own tuition and
living expenses; racial scholarship quotas will thus have the foreseeable effect of
excluding such individuals from the school in question, or from college alto-
gether.140  Nevertheless, the Administration appeared to believe that any such
exclusionary impact could not be traced to race-conscious decisionmaking, but
was instead attributable to purely private forces, thus distinguishing the quotas
at issue in Bakke.  Race-based scholarships, the Administration argued, did not
erect the same type of absolute bar to admission erected by the quotas in
Bakke.
This argument, however, does not withstand scrutiny.  A “Catholics only”
scholarship policy would not, by itself, exclude individuals of the Presbyterian,
Baptist, or Jewish faith from a college; members of each group could still pay
their own way.  Still, such a policy would be subject to strict scrutiny.  At any
rate, the main vice of the quota system in Bakke was not that it erected an “ab-
solute bar” to some students, but rather that it denied non-minority students in-
dividualized consideration for an important government benefit.141  This denial,
Justice Powell held, did not advance a compelling state interest, because Davis
was not pursuing diversity in a consistent fashion.  Racial scholarship quotas
also deny non-minority applicants individualized consideration, and do so in
pursuit of racial diversity simpliciter.  Such schemes are, therefore, plainly in-
consistent with Bakke.
At any rate, the Administration’s narrow definition of “exclusion” is incon-
sistent with the result and holding of Bakke.  By itself, the quota system in
Bakke did not exclude anyone:  Non-minorities were free to compete for the
eighty-four seats not subject to the quota.  Individuals who lost that competition
did so because their test scores, undergraduate record and interview skills did
not “measure up” compared to non-minorities who were admitted.  Race-
specific scholarships do not affect an individual’s willingness and ability to pay
the school’s tuition and room and board, but they nevertheless ensure that some
individuals will not attend the school in question.  Similarly, Davis’s quota plan
did not affect the objective qualifications of applicants such as Allan Bakke;
however, the plan “excluded” some individuals from medical school.
Moreover, it is of little significance that some donors might provide support
only for race-specific scholarships, with the result that banning race-specific
scholarships might not increase the amount of aid to be distributed on race-
neutral grounds.  Private individuals and foundations are perfectly free to dis-
agree with Bakke; they may even distribute race-specific aid directly to stu-
dents, so long as they do not involve state universities or private institutions
                                                          
140. This assumes, of course, that a prohibition on scholarship quotas would cause schools to divert
the aid in question to needy students.  OCR took issue with such an assumption, arguing that outlawing
such scholarships would simply lead schools to divert these resources to recruiting efforts.  This argu-
ment ignores the fact that donors and state legislatures often earmark funds for financial aid, funds that
cannot be diverted to other purposes.
141. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (discussing Bakke’s requirement of individualized
consideration).
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that receive federal funds in the process.  Nevertheless, the state cannot give the
force of law to preferences deemed illegitimate by the Constitution.142  Fur-
thermore, states and colleges cannot lend direct or indirect assistance to private
individuals or institutions that practice illegitimate racial discrimination.143
Colleges cannot shirk their constitutional responsibilities because private par-
ties wish to subsidize unconstitutional state action.  A university cannot ignore
the Constitution because a benefactor will not have it any other way.
OCR’s “narrow tailoring” argument is also defective.  Although OCR
claimed that scholarship quotas might be necessary to attract minority students
to some schools, it adduced no evidence to support this dubious proposition.
Moreover, OCR did not explain or suggest just how someone could falsify a
school’s assertion that some students would apply only if a scholarship quota is
in place.144  OCR’s position, then, would seem to empower schools to adopt such
quotas based solely on their own ipso dixit.  At any rate, OCR’s assertion that
scholarship quotas are necessary to attract minority students does not withstand
scrutiny.  OCR did not explain why minorities will not apply to a school that
                                                          
142. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 429 (1984) (“Private biases may be outside the reach of the
law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917); see also Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
143. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding that the state may not provide even in-
direct financial assistance to private schools that engage in racial discrimination); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (state may not lease facilities in public buildings to private indi-
viduals engaged in racial discrimination).
144. In one ruling that post-dated the release of OCR’s policy guidance, the Department relied
solely upon a university’s characterization of its interviews with minority students to conclude that
scholarship set-asides were narrowly tailored to attract African-American matriculants.  See Letter to
Mr. John C. Scully, Counsel, Washington Legal Foundation, at 2 (Feb. 21, 1997) (scrutinizing race-
based scholarships at Florida Atlantic University).  Such hearsay evidence, of course, would be inad-
missible in any court and forms a poor basis for the Department’s finding that the program in question
survives strict scrutiny.  Cf. City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 500 (1989) (requiring “strong
basis in evidence” before preferences can satisfy strict scrutiny); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310-11 & n.46 (re-
fusing to credit “evidence” contained in a newspaper article).  It should be noted that, despite its find-
ing that the scholarships in question were consistent with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, the De-
partment also advised the university to allow non-minorities to apply for the scholarships in question,
making race only “a factor” in the award.  See Letter to Mr. John C. Scully, supra.  This adjustment of
the criteria governing the award did not cure its constitutional infirmity, in so far as pursuit of racial
diversity simpliciter, by means of a plus system or otherwise, does not constitute a compelling state in-
terest.  See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
I do not mean to suggest that the Department has always implemented its Policy Guidance in a
manner inconsistent with Bakke.  In one instance, the Seattle Office of OCR approved an agreement
with the University of Oregon requiring the school to eliminate race-based tuition waivers.  At this of-
fice’s behest, the waiver program was modified so as to require consideration of various diversity fac-
tors, in addition to race or ethnicity.  See Letter from Gary D. Jackson, Director Seattle Office, West-
ern Division, to Joseph W. Cox, Chancellor, Oregon State System of Higher Education (July 3, 1997).
Although it is not clear which diversity factors the University is employing under the agreement and
whether diversity is actually being pursued consistently, compliance with the agreement may well ren-
der the University’s policy consistent with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.  Application of similar
reasoning would void numerous scholarships currently employed by major universities around the
country.  See supra note 129 and accompanying text (describing various race-based scholarships publi-
cized on internet web sites at the University of Iowa, University of Michigan, and Ohio State Univer-
sity); see also infra note 150 and accompanying text (describing race-based scholarships in place at vari-
ous graduate programs).  These scholarships are “open and notorious,” and the Administration has
apparently taken no action against them.
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“merely” accords them a plus—sometimes a very large plus—in the admissions
process and “merely” accords them a plus when awarding financial aid?145  To
be sure, some minorities may not be aware of the size of the “plus” that schools
may accord.  Schools may easily remedy this information shortfall by explaining
the existence and magnitude of these pluses in the information they distribute
to potential applicants.  The availability of these less restrictive alternatives
forecloses any claim that scholarship quotas are “necessary” to attract minority
students.146
There is, moreover, another fundamental flaw in OCR’s reasoning.  Simply
put, the argument proves too much.  If scholarship quotas are an effective
method of attracting applications, then presumably admissions quotas are even
more effective.  What better way to attract minority applicants than to reserve a
fixed percentage of the entering class for any minority student who is qualified!
Nevertheless, the mere fact that an unconstitutional admissions system might
otherwise attract minority applicants did not save such a system in Bakke.  Un-
less Bakke is to be overruled, minorities’ preferences for scholarships reserved
for them cannot validate such set asides.
OCR also claimed that race-specific scholarships might be necessary to con-
vince minorities to attend an institution, perhaps because of its location or repu-
tation.  The notion is that schools should be allowed to “buy” students who are
attractive because of their race by offering them financial aid over and above
their demonstrated financial need, and over and above what they would receive
if race were deemed a “plus factor” in the award of scholarship aid.  OCR of-
fered no evidence, aside from statements by the schools themselves that schools
cannot generally attract a sufficient number of minority students by competing
“on the merits.”  Such statements do not establish that race-based scholarships
are “narrowly tailored.”  The statements are equally consistent with the exis-
tence of destructive competition between schools for minority students.  Once
some schools do begin to employ race-based scholarships, others will be forced
to follow their lead, or risk losing minority matriculants they would otherwise
attract.  It is not clear that such competition will do much to alter the actual dis-
tribution of students among schools.  The obvious solution to such destructive
competition would be a comprehensive ban on all race-based scholarships.
Finally, OCR’s reasoning suffers from an even more fundamental flaw.
Throughout its policy guidance, the Department effectively assumes that
achievement of a racially diverse student body constitutes a compelling state in-
terest.  There is no indication that, before diversity can be deemed a compelling
                                                          
145. According to one scholar, this plus is equivalent to 400 SAT points at elite colleges and univer-
sities.  See Thomas J. Kane, Racial and Ethnic Preferences in College Admissions, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 971,
991 (1998) (finding that, at selective institutions, “race weighs heavily in admission decisions: being
black or Hispanic has approximately the same effect on one’s chances of admission as two-thirds of a
grade point performance in high school or roughly 400 points on the SAT test”).
146. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 n.6 (Powell, J.) (Court should void race-conscious measure if less
problematic alternative will promote the interest in question “about as well.”); see also Bolger v. Young
Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (invalidating blanket ban on mailing of contraceptives where slightly
less effective alternatives were available.)
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interest, schools must show that they are pursuing various forms of diversity
consistently.147  Instead, OCR’s Policy Guidance is a signal to schools that they
may employ their financial aid programs to pursue racial diversity simpliciter,
while at the same time ignoring other forms of diversity.148  Such an approach is
plainly inconsistent with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, even if scholarship
set-asides are narrowly tailored to achieve a racially diverse student body.
Thus, the Administration’s attempt to justify race-specific scholarships fails
to pass muster under Bakke.  There is, however, one last argument in OCR’s
quiveran argument that purports to justify the use of race-based scholarships
by graduate and professional schools, if not by undergraduate institutions.
More precisely, OCR argued that race-specific scholarships were narrowly tai-
lored to serve the “compelling interest” of increasing the number of minority
graduate and professional students, and thus ultimately enhancing the diversity
of the academy.149  Indeed, OCR went so far as to argue that a school could em-
ploy such scholarships even if its student body was already diverse because the
enrollment of additional racial minorities could lead to further diversification of
the national community of scholars, thus enhancing the quality of scholarly
dialogue that occurs within the academy.150
Like the other arguments for race-based scholarships, this argument comes
up short.  Simply put, “faculty diversity” is apparently not a compelling state in-
terest as Justice Powell defined that term in Bakke.  Significant evidence sug-
gests that, unlike the Harvard Plan, which pursued several forms of diversity,
the Academy does not pursue faculty diversity in any consistent fashion.  Take
the legal academy as an example.  It is common knowledge that individuals
from certain religious groups are vastly underrepresented at America’s law
                                                          
147. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (showing that failure to pursue diversity consis-
tently dooms programs under Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke).
148. The Department took just such an approach when analyzing race-specific scholarships awarded
by Florida Atlantic University.  Instead of asking whether the university was pursuing diversity across
the board, the Department asked whether the scholarships were necessary to achieve racial diversity.
Thus, the Department blessed the school’s creation of scholarships for African-Americans after finding
that the University had been able to recruit  “Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, and white students”
without employing race-based scholarships.  See Letter to Mr. John C. Scully, supra note 144, at 2.
There was no inquiry into whether the school had sought to attract students from varied religious, geo-
graphic, political, or economic backgrounds.
149. See Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761 n.8.  Cf. Office of Legal Counsel Memoran-
dum, supra note 52, at 18 n.30 (noting that “Justice Powell’s thesis may carry over to the selection of
university faculty: the greater the racial and ethnic diversity of professors, the greater array of perspec-
tives to which students would be exposed”).
150. See Final Policy Guidance, 59 Fed. Reg. at 8761 n.8.  Numerous universities apparently employ
such minority-only scholarships in their graduate and professional programs.  For instance, 45 schools
in 14 states participate in the “Doctoral Scholars Program,” which provides scholarship support only to
members of minority groups.  See SREB Doctoral Scholars  (visited Sept. 9, 1999)
<http://www.SREB.ORG/Programs/Doctoral/doctoral.html>.  Moreover, the University of Wisconsin
administers the Hastie Fellows Program, which provides financial and other support for minorities pur-
suing an LL.M. degree there.  See William H. Hastie Fellowship (visited Dec. 30, 1999)
<http://www.law.wisc.edu/lawatwis_fr/williamh.htm> (“The Hastie Fellowship is designed to assist and
prepare ethnic minority law school graduates for a career in law teaching.”).
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schools; Roman Catholics and evangelical Protestants come to mind.151  Political
conservatives are also few and far between.152  Yet, for all the discussion within
the legal academy about “faculty diversity,” law schools make almost no effort
to diversify their faculties along religious or political lines.153  Applicants who
are Republicans, Fundamentalists, or both receive no “plus” in law school hir-
ing processes.  Some have even suggested that they receive a minus.154  There
are no fellowships designed to increase the number of Roman Catholics teach-
ing in law schools.  Simply put, the “diversity” project, at least as pursued in the
law schools, has one goal: increase the number of certain racial minorities on
law school faculties.155  There is no indication that this state of affairs is any dif-
ferent in other professional or graduate schools.  Contrary to the Administra-
tion’s assertions, pursuit of this form of diversity does not serve a compelling
state interest.156  In sum, the Administration has encouraged racial set-asides
that are plainly inconsistent with Bakke.
                                                          
151. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, “Equal Concern and Re-
spect,” and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 989, 996 (1993) (“My
life in the elite legal academy has been basically devoid of contact with committed Christians, especially
evangelical Protestants.  One can count literally on the fingers of one hand the number of publicly visi-
ble Protestant evangelicals who hold tenured positions at America’s ‘leading’ law schools.  In this re-
spect (and, undoubtedly, many others), no elite law school even remotely “looks like America,” at least
if that is meant to suggest that members of the various sub-cultures of American society should actively
participate in each of the institutional structures that comprise that society.”); Volokh, supra note 95, at
2072 (describing lack of religious diversity at UCLA Law School); id. at 2073 n.23 (reproducing survey
data showing that only 13.7% of law professors are Catholic, compared to 26% of the full-time working
population).
152. See Volokh, supra note 95, at 2073 n.23 (reproducing survey data showing that only 12.9% of
law faculties are Republicans, compared to 41% of the full-time working population).
153. See Sanford Levinson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2061,
2062 n.7 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS) (“Almost none of the contemporary demands for greater diver-
sity of voices within the academy include a call for a greater presence of the almost totally absent sound
of a strong religious sensibility.”).
154. See Martha Nussbaum, Cooking for a Job, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 253, 259 (1998) (opining that indi-
viduals “with unpopular religious or political beliefs” are disadvantaged in the law school hiring proc-
ess); id. at 260 (“I am sure that Christian conservatives are disadvantaged at some schools [in the hiring
process].”).
155. The bylaws of the American Association of Law Schools are telling in this regard.  Section 6-
4(a) requires schools to provide “equal opportunity in legal education for all persons, including faculty
and employees with respect to hiring, continuation, promotion and tenure . . . without discrimination or
segregation on the grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, handicap or disability, or
sexual orientation.” (emphasis added).  Section 6-4(c) provides that “A member school shall seek to
have a faculty, staff, and student body which are diverse with respect to race, color, and sex.”  Thus,
while member schools may not discriminate against individuals because of their religion, they are under
no obligation to assure that their faculties reflect the nation’s religious diversity.  Thus, the Association
has apparently made a conscious decision not to foster religious diversity.
156. See Hall, supra note 95, at 858-91; Michael Stokes Paulsen, Reverse Discrimination and Law
School Faculty Hiring: The Undiscovered Opinion, 71 TEX. L. REV. 993, 1001 (1993) (contending that
law schools’ reliance on “diversity” to justify racial preferences in hiring is pretextual); Volokh,  supra
note 95, at 2075-76.
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IV
THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF PREFERENCES
As shown above, the Clinton Administration has in various ways defied Jus-
tice Powell’s opinion in Bakke.  Standing alone, such defiance is not particularly
remarkable; there is a long tradition of executive branch constitutional interpre-
tation at odds with Supreme Court precedent.  There is, however, one impor-
tant difference between the Administration’s stance toward Bakke and, say,
President Lincoln’s approach to Dred Scott, or President Reagan’s stance to-
ward the Fairness Doctrine.  Unlike Lincoln or Reagan, President Clinton has
carried out his anti-Bakke campaign sub rosa, praising and gutting the decision
at the same time.  In doing so, the President forfeited the opportunity to call
upon the Court to reconsider Justice Powell’s conclusion that quotas are an im-
permissible method of achieving diversity.157  Moreover, the President also ab-
jured the chance to characterize Justice Powell’s endorsement of the Harvard
Plan as dicta, thereby challenging Justice Powell’s conclusion that pursuit of ra-
cial diversity simpliciter does not constitute a compelling state interest.  Far
from touching off any dialogue about the soundness of Justice Powell’s deci-
sion, the Administration’s quiet defiance has led to an apparent reaffirmation of
the status quo.
It is not difficult to understand why the Clinton Administration would re-
frain from advertising its defiance of Bakke.  Defiance of Supreme Court
precedent comes with a political costa cost that would be particularly high in
an environment skeptical about the fairness of racial preferences.  An admini-
stration that announced its support for scholarship quotas, “even though they
are inconsistent with Bakke,” would pay a high political price, as opponents of
such quotas would accuse it of ignoring the Constitution for political purposes.
Similarly, an administration that characterized Justice Powell’s endorsement of
a plus system as dicta and endorsed the FCC’s pursuit of racial diversity sim-
plicter would forfeit the constitutional high ground in the debate over prefer-
ences.  An administration that itself repudiated Bakke in this manner could not,
for instance, criticize the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood for disregarding a
“landmark” decision.158  Moreover, open defiance of Bakke could “let the genie
out of the bottle,” provoking a dialogue that might ultimately lead to a political
repudiation of preferences.
Whatever the short run considerations that might support it, the current
Administration’s strategy could boomerang over the longer term.  By continu-
ing to embrace Bakke as a rhetorical matter, the Administration has, in a sense,
strengthened the legitimacy of Justice Powell’s opinion which, after all, rejected
most arguments for preferences.  At the same time, by  encouraging colleges
and others to adopt programs plainly inconsistent with Bakke, the Administra-
                                                          
157. See generally Girardeau A. Spann, Writing Off Race, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 467 (Win-
ter/Spring 2000).
158. See supra note 54 (discussing Administration’s disagreement with Hopwood).
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tion created “targets of opportunity” for those who would challenge prefer-
ences in the courts.  Such challenges can do more than just void the individual
programs in question; they might also serve ultimately to undermine Bakke it-
self.  Consider in this respect a challenge to a minority-only scholarship scheme
justified as a means of “diversifying” the academy.  The academy’s obvious fail-
ure to pursue faculty diversity consistently would undermine the assertion that
such diversity is a “compelling state interest” that supports racially-targeted
scholarships.  Moreover, confining such a ruling to the scholarship context
would be difficult; a judicial finding that schools were not pursuing diversity
consistently would also undermine future assertions that, for instance, concern
for “diversity” justifies racial preferences in faculty hiring.
Of course, the Clinton Administration or, for that matter, a possible Gore
Administration, would not stand idly by as opponents of preferences attacked
the various programs the Administration has encouraged.  The Administration
could always argue that such programs are consistent with Bakke, or, in the al-
ternative, that Justice Powell simply “got it wrong” when, for instance, he con-
cluded that racial diversity was not itself a compelling interest.  The Administra-
tion could even claim that most of Justice Powell’s opinion was dicta, that is,
that he held merely that quotas were unlawful, and nothing else.  Still, Mr.
Clinton’s term will end in 2001, and Mr. Gore may not succeed him.  Moreover,
any attempt to dislodge Justice Powell’s opinion would face an uphill battle.
Any court would be reticent to jettison an opinion that has enjoyed, or at least
appeared to enjoy, such strong political support for more than two decades.  To
be sure, the Administration or other proponents of preferences could argue that
Bakke is “unworkable” or based on false premises.  Such arguments, however,
would have little credibility at such a late date coming as they would from
groups that have vociferously embraced Justice Powell’s opinion.  
The discussion thus far points to a larger shortcoming in the Administra-
tion’s approach to Bakke.  By refusing to announce its opposition to Justice
Powell’s approach publicly, the Administration missed an opportunity to touch
off and lead a national discussion about the meaning of “diversity” and, more
importantly, the extent to which the pursuit of racial diversity simpliciter can
justify racial preferences.  Such a discussion, informed by two decades of expe-
rience with Bakke, may well have led to a consensus that “diversity” (broadly
defined) is not in fact as compelling as Justice Powell thought it was.159  While
such a consensus would assuredly undermine Justice Powell’s diversity-based
approval of preferences, it would also focus renewed attention on other justifi-
cations for racial preferences, rationales that Justice Powell largely rejected in
Bakke.  Such a debate would undoubtedly be contentious.  It would also be
worth having.
                                                          
159. Cf. Meese, supra note 47, at 386-88 (arguing that Justice Powell’s Bakke opinion rested on false
assumptions about the manner in which preferences are administered).
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CONCLUSION
Like judges, Presidents are bound to uphold the Constitution.  In discharg-
ing this duty, Presidents need not defer to judges, but must instead apply their
own independent judgment to constitutional controversies.  While these inde-
pendent judgments may in some instances differ from those rendered by the
Supreme Court, such disagreement promotes an inclusive dialogue about the
Constitution’s meaninga dialogue that ultimately strengthens and legitimizes
the resulting settlement of constitutional questions.
President Clinton exercised such independent judgment concerning the con-
stitutionality of racial preferences.  Although the Clinton Administration pub-
licly embraced Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, various agencies actually de-
fied Justice Powell’s opinion in practice.  Such defiance did not, however, have
the salutary effects often associated with executive branch interpretation.  By
concealing his defiance of the Court, President Clinton deprived the public of
the benefits of constitutional discourse and ensured the maintenance of an un-
satisfying status quo.
